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TPFNTIFTCATION OF THF PARTIES
Appellant is K & T, Inc. dba Budget Rent-a-Car, re lured ... herein as "Budget."

Nonparty Manuel Dcano Ilerrera is referred to as "Ilerrera" and nonparty DI,SS,
Inc. is referred to as "DLSS."

mxRmimiiiiiN
This case is about one w ord

"'belonging." In Budget's previous case against

DLSS, the trial court ruled the credit card "belonged" to Herrera. In doing so, the court

strains the interpretation of the word to argue that Herrera owned the card. Further,
Voweil argues that because Herrera allegedly owned the card, Voweil cannot be made to
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v,.vwgors of the card. *li an nidi\ idu~i . . . . oluntarily allows another to use his or her credit
card, the cardholder has authorized the use of that card and is thereby responsible for any
charge
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against one or more of several obligors ... shall not discharge a co-obligor who was not a
party to the proceeding where judgment was rendered." I ITAH C O D E A N N . § 15-4-2.
Here,

(|
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Budget's judgment against DLSS in no way relieves Voweil of his obligation to honor the
charges he authorized.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DISREGARD
THROUGH 6 OF THE APPELLATE BRIEF

PARAGRAPHS

2

Vowell argues the Court should disregard paragraphs 2 through 6 of Budget's
statement of facts in its appellate brief, alleging the facts are unsupported by the record.
However, paragraphs 2 through 6 of Budget's appellate brief contain the same factual
allegations contained in Budget's complaint against Vowell (the "Complaint"), attached
as Addendum "A" to the appellate brief. Specifically, support for paragraphs 2 through 6
of the appellate brief is found in paragraphs 8 through 13 of the Complaint. Because this
is an appeal from the district court's order granting Vowell's motion to dismiss, the Court
must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint, as reiterated in the appellate brief, as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to
plaintiff. See Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, /nc, 909 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah
1996).
Vowell also objects to the information contained in Addendum "C" to the
appellate brief, which is a record of conversations between Vowell and American
Express, in which Vowell identifies himself as a "silent officer" and "joint owner" of
DLSS. Again, this appeal is of an order granting Vowell's motion to dismiss. Vowell's
objection serves to underscore that there has been limited factual development of the case.
Budget did not have the opportunity to enter into extensive discovery with Vowell before
the case was dismissed.

For that reason, the lower court record is indeed sparse.
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Budget's Addendum "C" shows only that there are factual issues that have not been, and
which need to be, explored.
II.

UTAH LAW SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZES LAWSUITS AGAINST
CO-OBLIGORS WHERE JUDGMENT AGAINST AN OBLIGOR HAS
ALREADY BEEN ENTERED

The theme of Vowell's argiments is that because Budget has already obtained a
judgment against DLSS for the debts incurred on the credit card, Vowell is relieved from
his obligation for the debt. However, Utah law clearly contemplates that even where
judgment is obtained against one obligor of an obligation, such judgment does not
preclude seeking recovery from a co-obligor. "A judgment against one or more of several
obligors ... shall not discharge a co-obligor who was not a party to the proceeding where
the judgment was rendered." UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-4-2. The evidence submitted in the
case against DLSS and the limited evidence discovered in the present matter clearly show
that Vowell was an obligor for the credit card at issue. He is listed as a the "cardmember"
on American Express's invoices.

See American Express Invoice, submitted in the

previous action as "Plaintiffs Exhibit 6," attached hereto as Addendum "A."
III.

BUDGET'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY ISSUE PRECLUSION

The first element necessary for successfully asserting issue preclusion is the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant
action. See Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 847 (Utah 2004). Although Vowell argues
the issues litigated in Budget's action against DLSS are identical to the ones asserted
here, this is not true. In Budget's action against DLSS, the issue presented for the court's
3

consideration was whether the contracts DLLS entered into with Budget were
enforceable.

The court found they were. Here, the issue presented for the court's

consideration is whether Vowell is obligated to answer for the debt of DLSS.
Further, in order to successfully assert issue preclusion, Vowell must show that the
issue in the first action was completely, fully and fairly litigated. Id. Two central issues
in Budget's action against Vowell were not fully litigated in Budget's action against
DLSS: (1) whether Vowell is obligated to answer for the debts of DLSS, as discussed
above; and (2) whether the American Express Credit Card at issue is owned by Vowell.
In his brief, Vowell argues the court's statement in the previous case that the credit card
"belongs to DLLS" is conclusive proof that the issue was completely, fully and fairly
litigated.

See Brief of Appellee ("Vowell's Brief), p. 10. However, the issue of

ownership of the credit card was not litigated as part of that case except to the extent to
show that DLSS exercised control of and authority to use the credit card. Ultimate
ownership of the card was not fully and fairly litigated. Although Vowell may see no
distinction between "ownership" and "belonging," the distinction is significant in this
case - the previous court only determined that Vowell had authorization to use the credit
card, but did not determine ultimate ownership of the card.
Vowell's insistence on a rigid interpretation and enforcement of the court's statement
is the type of formalism rejected by Justice Cardozo in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,
118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1914). There, where the defendant insisted on a rigid interpretation
and enforcement of a contract, Justice Cardozo noted, "The law has outgrown its
4

primitive style of formalism where the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and
every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today." Id.

Despite the court's statement

that the card "belongs" to DLSS, the issue of ownership of the credit card and, more
broadly, the issue of Vowell's obligation to answer for the debt of DLSS, were never
litigated.
IV.

BUDGET'S ACTION AGAINST VOWELL IS NOT PRECLUDED BY
CLAIM PRECLUSION

Vowell argues the elements of claim preclusion are met. Claim preclusion "bars a
party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated
previously." Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, 686
(Utah 2005). As argued above, Budget's claim that Vowell is responsible for the debt of
DLSS was not previously litigated at all, let alone fully litigated.
Vowell complains "he was not a party to the prior action, did not get to conduct
discovery, did not get to review evidence, etc." Vowell's Brief, p. 12. However, Vowell
is not precluded in the present action from questioning witnesses, including Herrera,
conducting discovery and reviewing evidence. Vowell is not precluded in the present
action from asserting defenses based upon an alleged lack of authorization for the use of
the credit card. In short, Vowell will be permitted his day in court.
Vowell also argues Budget's claims against him were "available" in the action against
DLSS and should have been brought there.

However, Budget's attempt to obtain

satisfaction from the corporate debtor before pursuing Vowell does not serve as a waiver
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of its claims against Vowell.
V,

BUDGET'S ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE
TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

Vowell argues he cannot be ordered to answer for the debt of another without being
given the opportunity to contest the underlying debt. Vowell does not cite to any relevant
legal authority to support his argument.

Even so, nothing in the Complaint against

Vowell precludes Vowell from disputing not only his liability to answer for the debt of
DLSS, but the debt itself. Budget has not claimed the judgment against DLSS has any
preclusive effect on Vowell.
Vowell also argues he will need both Herrera and DLSS and co-defendants in the
present action in order to defend himself. See Vowell's Brief, p. 16. Vowell does not
explain why he needs Herrera and DLSS as co-defendants. If Vowell needs testimony or
other evidence from them, he may call them as witnesses or subpoena any necessary
information. If he feels strongly that they should be parties, he may bring them in as third
parties pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 14(a).
Vowell is also concerned that a failure to join Herrera and DLSS as parties raises the
risk of incurring inconsistent obligations. See Vowell's Brief, p. 17. There is no risk of
inconsistent obligations. If Vowell is held liable to answer for the debt of DLSS, or even
if he is not, the result will not be inconsistent with Judge Dever's finding that DLSS is
responsible for the debt.
Finally, if it's true, as Vowell alleges, that Herrrera and DLSS are indispensable
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parties, the proper remedy is to order that they be joined, rather than dismiss the action in
its entirety. Vowell has jumped to the conclusion that the lower court in this case must
either proceed without DLSS or dismiss the case. Vowell has not shown why DLSS and
Herrera are indispensable. Further, he has not shown why, even if they are indispensable,
they cannot be joined to the present action. Thus, the lower court committed error by
failing to give Budget the opportunity to join parties it considered indispensable.

Conclusion
The lower court's decision to grant Vowell's motion to dismiss should be reversed
because: (1) Utah statute specifically allows a subsequent suit against an obligor where a
judgment has already been entered against his co-obligor; (2) Budget's claims are not
precluded by either issue preclusion or claim preclusion; (3) Budget did not fail to join
indispensable parties; and (4) even if Budget failed to join indispensable parties, the
correct remedy is to order the joinder of those parties, rather than dismiss the case.
DATED this p | Q

day of December, 2007.
WINDER & HALSAM, P.C.

DONALD J. W I D E R
LANCE F. SORENSON

Attorneys for Plaintiff K & T, Inc. d/b/a Budget
Rent-A-Car

7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^) j( day of December, 2007,1 caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be sent
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
N. Adam Caldwell
Snow, Jensen & Reece
134 North 200 East, #302
St. George, Utah 84711
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ADDENDUM A

Page I

Chargeback Keport
Serrleot

Friday, December 27 2002 11:33:48 AM
Chargeback Period: 12/01/2002 through 12/27/2002

Total no.of new chargebacks:
Total no.of viewed chargebacks
Total no.of sent chargebacks:
Total no.of no reply:
Total no.of others:

Chargeback Summary Report For 5433910213
No.of
Total Chargeback
chargebacks
Amount
3
($105,774.21)
0
$0.00
0
$0.00
0
$0.00
0
$0.00
3

Total:

BUDGEfcEMTACAA
aUOGE RENTACAR
SUDGE RENTACAR

ttorchont
Numbof
5433910213
S433S10213
3433O10213

Statu*
Now
Now
NOW

Chonjo
Doto
02/OSV20Q2
03/01/2002
10/030002

Origin* Cofdmombor
Numoor
3727111S1S43012
3727111S1S43012
37*5197S77S1007

Location Total:

Prim

or Lou Harris <lou@budget»tfah.com>

|

($35,258.07)

($105.774.21)

Location:BUDGE RENT A CAR

Chargeback dataila for merchant #: 5433910213
Location

Average Chargeback
Amount
($35,256.07)
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00

cojfflmomDor

to66LW>KELL
TOOOLVOWEUL
KENT LEWS FOfttlFBER

Cnorgoaock
Do*
12/24/2002
12/24/2002
12/00/2002

Ctto
Amount
iwnsii
(l5i.4O3.07) 0227101
mr io%.7S) 0227002
0230001
(S1*t,mt1)

Chonjo
Amount

DIopul*
Amount
30.00
SO 00
30.00

i

Chargeback Statue

•12,104J0

I0.H I

12/27|

